The focus of this paper is the construction of identity within the context of English legal practice and process. Its subject matter is the protracted civil litigation that extended from a brief County Court 
Ibid, 54 11 Ibid 12 Ibid 13 Ibid, x 14 Ibid 15 Ibid, 169 16 Ibid, 134 17 Ibid, 53. Lindemann recognises here that her generalisation may not apply to persons with severe cognitive disabilities or some forms of autism. extent to which we are obliged to hold another person in a particular identity is a much more complex task. Here Lindemann concedes that 'a great many considerations might have to be weighed in a judgment of this sort.' 24 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF LEGAL PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Lindemann's observations concerning the four elements of the social construction of identity are based around key stages in human development, beginning with identity formation in infancy and ending with a consideration of 'identities at the end of life '. 25 This research adopts an analogous approach; by focusing its investigation of how the identity of the litigant is variously constructed, held and let go of around the extended 'lifecycle' the civil litigation process. Thus its remit extends from the steps leading up to the first instance hearing, continues through the appeal process and reaches forward to the formal reporting of the litigation and its subsequent uptake in the media. 18 Ibid, ix 19 Ibid, 97 20 Ibid, 121 21 Ibid, 120 22 Ibid 23 Ibid, 121 24 Ibid, 121-122 25 Ibid, chapter 6. Lindemann also gives specific consideration to 'calling the fetus into personhood' in chapter 2 ask them? Will they recognise themselves? In taking this approach the author draws on wellestablished 'law and narrative' scholarship that highlights the role of particular stories as a means to challenging long-established modes of behaviour or practice. 28 Lindemann's earlier work Damaged Identities: Narrative Repair 29 has also been influential here. Lindemann contends that 'just as a counterstory could be developed by an individual to define herself morally, so a counterstory that reidentifies an individual can be generalized to revise a moral understanding about a group to which the individual belongs.' 30 On this basis, it is surely possible for us to take Mr Kernott's counterstory, and see it as a reasonably typical story of a lay person's experience of litigation. We have already concluded that whilst Jones v Kernott is a notable case because of the points of law it establishes, there is nothing particularly noteworthy about its procedural aspects. And in looking at this particular story of litigation as a means through which we have constructed Mr Kernott's identity, this paper constitutes a re-telling of commonplace litigation practice and process that might cause us to reconfigure that process, and so prompt us to see it differently. As a means of emphasising this different perspective, extracts from Mr Kernott's first-person narrative are presented verbatim in the forthcoming discussion. Kernott and his former Partner, Ms Jones, it is apparent that Mr Kernott's sense of self is expressed primarily with reference to his relationships with others; his former partner, his children and his friends, and is legitimised through repeated references to his perceived norms of social behaviour;
IN THE BEGINNING…

I met Miss Jones in or around
"how things should be"… "a normal couple"… "normal things that people do"… "do the man thing." This form of expression allows him to create a credible picture of himself as a 'normal bloke' living a 'normal life'; once part of a couple, bringing up children, going on family holidays, going to the gym. It is an example of that which Lindemann describes as 'the public expression of private thought… "the raw data out of which others form their sense of me"' or, in other words, the second 'expressive' stage in Lindemann's analysis. As Lindemann acknowledges, all such expression is necessarily selective.
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In presenting our thoughts and ideas to the world, we do so in a way that either consciously or subconsciously emphasises aspects of ourselves that we wish to project to a particular audience. 32 So whilst the description that Mr Kernott gives here is admittedly selective, we all possess and consistently use this privilege in the manner in which we present ourselves, without losing claim to authenticity. We remain free to question, affirm or reject Mr Kernott's expression of identity here; to hold on to or let go of the identity of the 'normal bloke' that he portrays. 
The Disorienting Effect of Legal Proceedings and the Disintegration of Personhood
The form of the witness statement is significant also in that it strips away from Mr Kernott all of the 'props' or supports that he leans upon heavily in validating his self-identity. There is no room in a court document for overt references to perceived norms of social behaviour, so Mr Kernott loses, or has taken from him, his usual terms of reference. He cannot claim to be a 'normal bloke' when telling his story in the in the context of legal proceedings. The litigation process serves also to remove him, or at least distance him, from the relationships that he relies upon in maintaining his identity as a father, as part of a broken relationship, but nevertheless in his view, still as a part of a family.
Prior to the onset of the dispute, Mr Kernott remained on reasonably good terms with his former partner, but of course this became strained as he sought to persuade her that he needed to release his share in the property. Once the dispute became a legal one, any direct communication between the parties came to an end, and animosity increased. The relationship between Mr Kernott and his children also became more and more strained as the litigation proceeded. There is evident here a very strong desire for an opportunity to express a view, to reassert an opinion, to create an opportunity for others to acknowledge him at least as 'not a bad bloke.' But arguably by this stage, although he remains physically present as an appellant or a respondent at each court hearing, Mr Kernott as a person had largely disappeared. This is evidenced most powerfully by his experience of being refused admittance to the court room for the final hearing:
So about a year later it went to the Supreme High Court and…And we sat down in a room with my barrister and my lawyer. And then I went in the court room which then I wasn't allowed in because it
was full up. And that was when I just said to the security, "I'll go home then." And then my barrister said to the security, "It's Mr Kernott" and he said, "Oh, down the front."
A LOSS OF AGENCY
At this point in the paper, the reader, and perhaps especially the legal practitioner, may wish to issue a strong reminder that Mr Kernott, acting under his own free will, instructed a solicitor and then a barrister to act for him in his dispute with Ms Jones, and so he voluntarily gave up his right to address the higher courts. He could, at least in theory, have represented himself during the trial process and so spoken freely on his own behalf at each hearing, had he chosen to do so. This is acknowledged. 42 However, the concerns of this paper relate to a loss of agency that occurred in the course of the legal proceedings, which is presented here as essentially a moral issue, rather than a legal one. Mr
Kernott's legal representatives had a duty to represent his case to the best of their ability and they did so. However it is argued that they, together with all others involved in the proceedings, held also a moral duty to respect his autonomy. Lindemann argues that 'respect for autonomy, notions of personal responsibility, and individualized conceptions of moral agency…are widely shared in westernized, postindustrial societies. In the form of life characterised by those moral understandings, individuals are held to account for how they conduct themselves; we are expected to lead our own 
But in the meantime it was … "how are we going to appeal...don't worry about a thing, this is outrageous we're going to appeal." I was never asked "do you want to appeal?" "Do you want to go this far?" It was "everything's in place, the bundles are there, it just goes to a higher part of the court." And then it was this big one [the Court of Appeal], it was the same court but a different room
where there were more people.
[ This judgment stands too as the primary source of 'the facts of the case' and as such is treated with some reverence in the higher courts, despite being the subject of an appeal. As Nicholas Strauss QC explains in the High Court; 'Turning to the facts of the present case, I must take these almost entirely from the judgment. There was some dispute as to the facts between the parties, and both were crossexamined, but there is no appeal against the judge's findings of fact and I cannot go behind them.'
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In the Court of Appeal, Jacob LJ offers the following explanation for this: 'the Judge, having seen and heard the parties was in a better position to decide the matter -and particularly the intentions of the parties -than we are.' 54 And although he decides that in this case 'the evidence, findings and reasoning simply provide no support' 55 for the judge's decision, Rimer LJ yet agrees in principle that 'an appellate court must exercise caution before reversing a judge on the facts.' 56 This view is repeated in the judgment of Lady Hale and Lord Walker in Supreme Court: 'The trial judge has the onerous task of finding the primary facts and drawing the necessary inferences and conclusions, and appellate courts will be slow to overturn the trial judge's findings.'
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As Jacob LJ affirms, it is only Dedman, J. who writes his judgment 'having seen and heard the parties' 58 and this increases our expectation that we will 'find' Mr Kernott in these much-hallowed 'trial judge's findings'; they are surely the 'birth records' of his legal identity and they will give us some insight establishing which aspects of his identity were responded to and acknowledged, and which were let go of in the course of the first hearing. How surprising then, that Mr Kernott possesses no copy of this judgment. No copy of the judgment was retained by the County Court and at the time of writing, the author's attempts to retrieve a copy of this judgment from Mr Kernott's legal representatives or from the higher courts have proved unfruitful. Mr Kernott's 'birth records' seem to have disappeared. As the litigation proceeded to the higher courts, the judgments were reported and these provide us with second, third and fourth hand accounts of 'the facts of the case' as established in the first hearing. As we will see, whilst they are loathed to overturn Dedman, J.'s findings, judges in the higher courts have the unavoidable opportunity of emphasising (holding on to) or minimising (letting go of) aspects of this first judgment, and indeed aspects of the intervening appeal judgments, as they see fit. In so doing, they work to emphasise or minimise aspects of Mr Kernott's identity that these 'facts of the case' reveal.
longer holds any papers relating to the case, is able to print any orders from its computer system or has a copy of the tape recording. 
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding paragraphs have sought to demonstrate that certain aspects of identity were expressed, responded to and affirmed during the court proceedings that determined the outcome of Mr Kernott's dispute with his former partner, and that these aspects of identity are those that Mr Kernott either explains differently or implicitly refutes when presenting his own version of events. Nevertheless, these combine to form the identity of Mr Kernott that exists now as a matter of public record.
Previously, it has been established that also in the course of the legal proceedings, Mr Kernott's selfidentity diminished rapidly to the point of disappearance, causing him to navigate the legal proceedings in a state of disorientation. It has already been noted in this paper that Mr Kernott's experience of the litigation process is not unique. The aspects of his identity that have been discussed are particular to him but the legal processes that have been described are commonplace. The terms 'instructing solicitors' and 'instructing counsel' are commonly used in legal practice but they are mostly inapt. As we have seen, the notion that non-legally qualified but competent adults have full capacity to direct the course of legal proceedings is overly simplistic, when considered in light of the interrelationship between identity and agency. Witness statements are required to be sworn as true before submission to the court, but they are co-constructed and standardised in both style and form. A litigant who is represented in court proceedings will commonly meet their barrister on the day of the hearing but otherwise all correspondence between the litigant and the barrister is mediated by the instructing solicitor.
Litigants who have legal representation have limited opportunity to speak freely at the first hearing, and no opportunity to speak thereafter. So when a case proceeds to appeal, the litigant finds that he or she is increasingly spoken about in court yet decreasingly spoken to. If we take this distinction and apply it to the litigation process that this paper has sought to describe, it is arguable that the responsibility of holding Mr Kernott in his particular identity fell to his legal representatives, not as a matter of choice or principle, but in practice as a result of their initial failure to hold him in personhood. To explain further, we have seen already the significant loss of agency that occurs alongside a loss of self-identity. At the same time as Mr Kernott loses his sense of selfidentity, he places his 'faith' in his legal representatives, effectively transferring his decision-making powers to them. Arguably then, in relation to Mr Kernott, they become his proxy decision makers; not by choice but through circumstance. 90 And as proxy decision makers, they owe Mr Kernott a moral duty to exercise autonomy on his behalf; to represent him in a manner that reflects the person who he considers himself to be. The duty is one that they would not consciously recognise or accept, but arises nevertheless.
Finally, it is necessary to consider how far we might be required to hold Mr Kernott in the identity of the 'normal bloke' that he presents in the extracts of his narrative account set out in this paper. Are we obliged to relinquish his identity as revealed by the 'facts of the case' and subsequently exaggerated in the press in favour of that which is revealed in his first-hand account? Or conversely, must we dismiss his account on the basis that the trial judge had the benefit of hearing 'both sides of 88 Ibid, 176-177 89 Ibid, 176 90 Ibid, 174 that narratives are necessarily subjective and constitutive; 'stories people tell about themselves and their lives both constitute and interpret those lives; the stories describe the world as it is lived and understood by the storyteller.' 92 Furthermore, Lawler explains that although the stories through which we explain ourselves will 'always incorporate the life stories of others. They will not be the same as those others' stories; they will always be particular versions.' 93 On this basis we may feel justified in dismissing Mr Kernott's account as wholly subjective and opt to return to the familiar security of the facts as determined by the court. However, it is argued that to do so is to overestimate the objectivity of the trial judge's findings. Jerome Frank maintained that an unquestioning adherence to the judge's findings of fact -as can be seen in the appellate courts' consideration of Jones v Kernott -represents a form of 'modern legal magic' that lawyers choose believe in in order to avoid the terror of uncertainty. 94 He states:
The 'facts,' it must never be overlooked, are not objective If we possess the bravery to accept or at least entertain this alarmingly subjective account of 'the facts of the case' then our objection to the subjective nature of Mr Kernott's own narrative account must surely diminish. Subsequently, we are free to hold on or let go of the identity of Mr Kernott as revealed in both of these two accounts. But importantly, neither can lay claim to our full allegiance.
The paper concludes by focusing attention back to Lindemann's view of the broader concept of personhood, and the mutual duties that arise from it. She states '[i]n the most general terms, personhood gives us ourselves; we can't be who we are without other persons who initially hold us and then maintain us in personhood.' 96 These are universal duties of vast significance. Yet a close
